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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                         
No. 08-3347
                         
ERIC HILL; KATRINA HILL,
Appellants
v.
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; LEON KING, COMMISSIONER OF THE CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA PRISONS DEPARTMENT; LOUIS GIORLA; DARRYL
ANDERSON; SHARON HATCHER; ALL DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN THE CITY
OF PHILADELPHIA; MARVIN PORTER
                                             
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-05-cv-06574)
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
                                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 13, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH and GARTH , Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 14, 2009)
                             
OPINION
                            
PER CURIAM
Eric and Katrina Hill appeal, pro se, from an order of the district court granting
     1 Inasmuch as Katrina Hill alleged only a derivative loss of consortium claim, when we
refer to “appellant” or “Hill” we are referring to Eric Hill.
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summary judgment in favor of Darryl Anderson, the City of Philadelphia, Louis Giorla,
Sharon Hatcher, Leon King and Marvin Porter (collectively “appellees”) in the Hills’
civil suit alleging violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow,
we will summarily affirm.
I.
In September 1987, Hill began his career as a correctional officer in the City of
Philadelphia Prisons System and in 1996 he became a union delegate.1  In his role as a
delegate, Hill filed two grievances against appellee Porter on behalf of Officer Denean
Osborne who alleged that Porter sexually harassed her.  On November 3, 2004, Donnie
Moore, president of the local union, Hill, and Porter met regarding Osborne’s allegations. 
At the conclusion of the meeting Porter requested that Hill remain to discuss another
matter.  Moore asked if it was necessary for him to remain as Hill’s representative.  Porter
allegedly misrepresented the situation as one that would not be disciplinary in nature so
Moore would leave the office.  Porter, with union shop steward Peter Shaw present,
began to question Hill about sexual misconduct and inappropriate behavior Hill allegedly
engaged in with a female inmate.  According to Hill, he did not have an opportunity to
confer with, or request, union representation.  Hill denied the allegations.  Porter then
requested that Hill write a memorandum regarding the misconduct but Hill, claiming that
the allegations were false, refused to write the memorandum.  Porter reported Hill to
3appellee Giorla who also asked him questions about the sexual misconduct.  Giorla then
requested that appellee King issue a formal reprimand to Hill for failure to obey a direct
order.
Hill alleges that the investigation against him was not conducted according to
procedures established by the Philadelphia Prisons System.  Notwithstanding the required
confidentiality of the proceedings, other employees learned of the investigation and Hill
began receiving telephone calls at home concerning the accusations.  The Prison
Disciplinary Board eventually found that the charges of sexual misconduct were
unsubstantiated.
Hill also alleges that, as a result of the grievance he filed on behalf of Osborne, he
was denied promotions and was subject to a pattern of harassment and retaliation.  One
such incident took place on January 25, 2005, when, according to Hill, Porter and Giorla
blocked Hill’s car while another corrections officer issued a parking ticket.  Hill took a
vacation day in order to defend against the ticket, which was ultimately dismissed. 
Appellee Hatcher, however, changed his vacation day to an administrative leave day.  Hill
successfully filed a grievance in order to change the day back to a vacation day.  
In the spring of 2005, Hill was again subject to disciplinary action.  After speaking
directly to appellee King in reference to the incidents of retaliation and a possible
promotion, King imposed a two-step reduction in pay, a three-day suspension and
removal from the prestigious Correctional Emergency Response Team.  The disciplinary
action was based on Hatcher’s allegation that Hill, in contravention of prison regulations,
     2  Rule 58, with several exceptions which do not apply here, requires every judgment
and amended judgment to be set forth in a separate document.
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possessed a cell phone on prison property and that he had abandoned his post.
On December 15, 2005, Hill, represented by counsel, filed suit in the district court
alleging violations of his right to free speech under the First Amendment and due process
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Hill also alleged state law claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and defamation.  Katrina Hill, Hill’s
wife, filed a claim alleging that, due to the alleged retaliatory actions of the appellees, she
suffered a loss of consortium.
After the parties concluded discovery, appellees filed an unopposed motion for
summary judgment which the district court granted.  The district court signed a
memorandum and order granting summary judgment on June 30, 2008, and on the next
day, July 1, the district court clerk entered the memorandum and order on the docket.  The
July 1 memorandum contained an order of judgment in favor of defendants.  On July 2,
2008, the district court, perhaps in order to ensure compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58,
issued the order of judgment again and on the same day the clerk docketed that order
separately.2  On August 1, 2008, appellants filed a pro se notice of appeal purporting to
challenge the July 1 order.  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely and
a motion for summary affirmance.
II.
 A party in a civil case is required to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of
5entry of judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).   Here, appellees argue that
inasmuch as the appellants are attempting to challenge the July 1 order of judgment, their
notice of appeal filed on August 1, thirty-one days after the entry of judgment, is
untimely.  We disagree.  
Under Rule 58, a judgment is not entered until the order of judgment is set out in a
separate document.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(A).  An order is treated as a separate
document if it: 1) is self-contained and separate from the opinion, 2) notes the relief
granted, and 3) omits (or at least substantially omits) the trial court’s reasons for
disposing of the claims.  In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir.
2006).  The July 1 order satisfies the second and third criteria but falls short of the first. 
“To be independent of the court’s opinion, an order must be separately titled and
captioned, not paginated consecutively to the opinion and memorandum, not stapled or
otherwise attached to the opinion, and must be docketed separately.”  LeBoon v.
Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
The July 1 order of judgment was paginated consecutively to the opinion and was not
separately docketed.  In contrast, the July 2 judgment order satisfies all three
requirements and is in compliance with Rule 58.  Thus, the thirty-day time period for
taking of an appeal started on July 2 and the appellants’ notice of appeal, though it
purported to challenge the July 1 order, was timely filed.  Accordingly, appellees’ motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied.  
We have jurisdiction over the final order of the district court under 28 U.S.C.
6§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 2009).  On
review, we apply the same standard as the district court.  United States ex rel. Kosenske
v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus the district court properly
granted summary judgment if “viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and drawing all inferences in that party’s favor, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.
(citations omitted). 
III.  
We begin with the general principle that we do not review evidence or issues that a
party did not first present to the district court.  See Appalachian States Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Comm’n v. Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Arnold
M. Diamond, Inc., v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 524 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that the appellant waived equitable subrogation argument on appeal because,
“[a]lthough [appellant] claims that it made this argument in its brief opposing Gulf
Coast’s motion for summary judgment . . . our review of that brief convinces us that this
argument was not fairly raised”); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 311 (3d Cir.
1978) (evidence not presented to district court may not be considered by court of
appeals).  Here, aside from asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant raises no
legal arguments and, in the appendix, attempts to introduce evidence which was not
     3 In ordinary civil disputes, parties may not obtain relief from the ineffective assistance
of counsel.  See Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 381 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rendell, J.,
dissenting).
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presented to the district court.3  We will not consider such evidence in rendering our
decision.  After a thorough review of the record that is properly before us, and for
substantially the reasons given by the district court, we determine that the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. 
First, we agree with the district court that official capacity suits cannot be
maintained against state officers acting in their official capacity on behalf of the state. 
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).  As to individual liability under § 1983, we
agree that appellees did not participate in violating appellant’s constitutional rights or
direct others to violate, or know of and acquiesce in their subordinates violations of
appellant’s rights.  Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995).  In that
regard, appellant fails to demonstrate that his representation of Osborne is the type of
speech which entitles him to First Amendment protection.  Specifically, appellant did not
show that he was acting as a citizen in his union representation of Osborne or that the
speech he engaged in during that representation was a matter of public concern.  See
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.”); see also  Fogarty v. Boles, 121 F.3d 886, 888 (3d Cir. 1997)
     4 In Weingarten, the Supreme Court upheld a decision of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) that an employer’s denial of an employee’s request for a union
representative during an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believed
might result in disciplinary action constituted an unfair labor practice.  420 U.S. at 262.
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(listing requirements public employee must meet to recover on a First Amendment
retaliation claim). 
Next, Hill argues that defendants deprived him of due process protections afforded
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  We agree with the district court that
Porter’s “interrogation” of Hill did not qualify as an official interrogation in a custodial
setting and therefore Miranda does not apply.  See Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1246
(3d Cir. 1994).  Further, Hill could not recover on a claim that he was denied a right to
union representation under National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251 (1975).4  The holding in Weingarten affirmed the NLRB’s interpretation and
enforcement of § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Id. at 253.  The City of
Philadelphia, however, is a political subdivision exempt from the provisions of the
NLRA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2); Felice v. Sever, 985 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (3d Cir. 1993);
Crilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 529 F.2d 1355, 1358 (3d Cir. 1976). 
Finally, we agree with the district court’s disposition of appellant’s derivative state
law claims.  The appellees’ conduct in this instance does not rise to the level of extreme
and outrageous conduct required to sustain an IIED claim.  See Hoy v. Angelone, 720
A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998) (in order to recover for IIED, defendant’s conduct must be so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
9decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society);
see also Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is
extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of
outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for [IIED].”)  Further, the
district court properly determined that an action for defamation could not survive
summary judgment since Hill did not produce evidence that defamatory statements were
communicated by individual defendants to others working in the prison system.  See 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8343(a) (listing requirements for a defamation action).  The district
court also properly dismissed appellant Katrina Hill’s claim for loss of consortium
inasmuch as her right to recover for loss of consortium derived only from her husband’s
ability to recover on his claims.  See Murray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 782 F.2d
432, 438 (3d Cir. 1986).
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant appellees’ motion for summary
affirmance and affirm the district court’s order in its entirety.  Appellees’ motion to be
relieved from filing a brief is granted.                    
